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Abstract  
       
There is much literature that argues that human trafficking (HT) is actually a down side of 
globalization since HT increased dramatically with globalization during the mid-1980s. 
However, it must be acknowledged that globalization is not the inherent cause of HT but an 
intermediary that helps to achieve it. Although much literature studies the nexus of globalization 
and human trafficking, there is a lack of publications to analyze the future impact of 
globalization on combating human trafficking. This project aims to fill the gap by providing an 
empirical analysis of whether globalization enhances countries’ ability to combat HT or not. This 
paper uses Tier Placement from the US Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Reports as 
measurement of nations’ capacity of combating HT (dependent variable) and trade openness, net 
FDI and globalization index as measurements of globalization (independent variable). Since the 
dependent variable is ordinal number with a certain order, this analysis uses ordered logit 
regression as the model. This paper finds that both globalization index and net FDI have a 
positive relationship with nations’ ability to combat HT, and therefore confirms that globalization 
enhances countries’ capacity to prevent HT.  
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Chapter I: Introduction  
 Human trafficking has been a problem since the late 1980s but this issue did not really 
enter into the mainstream until the 1990s. Most of the publications on this subject did not appear 
until the latter part of 1990s, when more and more parties started to regard HT as a serious threat 
(Christine, 2002). Combating human trafficking then has become an increasingly important 
political priority for many governments around the world. At the national level, greater efforts 
and resources are being devoted to combating this problem, and there is also universal agreement 
in the international community on the need for a multilateral response. Such a response is 
reflected in the UN Protocols on trafficking and smuggling signed in Palermo, Italy, in 2000.  
 Numerous root causes could explain the existence of human trafficking. The causes 
include high unemployment rates, poverty, economic inequality, gender and ethnic 
discrimination, and political instability and conflict. These factors are associated with pull factors 
of demand for cheap labor, the possibilities of higher standards of living, and flourishing illegal 
sexual business among the world. Although these causes have always existed, HT has flourished 
only since recent decades. There is much literature that argues that human trafficking is actually 
a down side of globalization since human trafficking increased dramatically with globalization 
during the mid-1980s (Alexis, 2009). Free markets, free trade, greater economic competition, 
and a decline in the state intervention in the economy has been a symbol of the contemporary 
globalizing process (Louise, 2003). This globalization process creates increasing communication 
among countries and greater mobility of goods and people. Therefore, it not only provides 
convenience to international trade and multinational corporations’ foreign investments, but also 
provides convenience to traffickers. It has facilitated speedy, low-cost and anonymous 
communications that are beneficial to the activities of HT. Moreover, increased speed and ease of 
	 8	
international financial flows facilitate money laundering and bribery (Joseph, 2003). Behind the 
poor, vulnerable, and isolated trafficking victims, there often exists an elaborate communication 
system that links the human traffickers with the global market for their goods. In general, free 
trade, free markets, and decline of border controls could be one of the push factors of HT.  
However, it must be acknowledged that globalization is not the inherent cause of HT but 
an intermediary that helps to make it possible. Rapidly advancing information, communication, 
and transportation technologies also drive economic growth, which is a factor in preventing 
human trafficking. The process of globalization is especially pronounced and entrenched in the 
world economy. Furthermore, globalization facilitates globalized law-enforcement networks. 
International Institutions, such as Interpol, the UN, and NGOs, associated with local 
governments are teaming up to combat human trafficking. Following the adoption of the Palermo 
Protocol initiated by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
many states have enacted new anti-trafficking laws or sought to bring their laws in line with 
international standards. Therefore, globalization could also be a determining factor in combating 
human trafficking.  
Although there is numerous literature studying the nexus of globalization and human 
trafficking, there is a lack of publications and empirical evidence to analyze the future impact of 
globalization on human trafficking. Topics like whether increasing global integration will 
enhance a nation’s ability to combat HT or will create more international organized criminal 
groups that conduct HT, are under discussed. This project aims to fill the gap by providing an 
empirical analysis on the relationship between globalization and countries’ capacity to prevent 
human trafficking.   
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The Matter of Definitions  
Definitions of HT  
At the outset, the issue of the trade in human beings received attention first and foremost 
in relation to the trade in women (Bertone, 2000). It was associated with the phenomenon of the 
“white slave trade” that had been vigorously condemned by human rights fighters and feminists 
in the late nineteenth century. During that period, the issue of the “white slave trade” coincided 
with an increase in the number of migrant prostitutes in Europe (Guy, 1992). In the late twentieth 
century, with industrialization and globalization, the activities of the sexual exploitation of 
women reappeared (Barry, 1995). This time, the “white slave trade” was transformed into 
“trafficking in women”, with the focus being on third world and non-western women 
(Kempadoo, 1998). The concept of “trafficking in women” was considered as a modern form of 
slavery or confined to the phenomenon of prostitution. However, Chuang notes, “The narrow 
portrayal of trafficking as necessarily involving forced recruitment for the purposes of forced 
prostitution thus belies the complexity of the current trafficking problem, and overlooks 
numerous victims whose experiences diverge from more traditionally recognized forms of 
trafficking.” (Chuang, 1998, page 66)) 
Chuang’s conception of HT rejected the old-fashioned idea of simply conceiving of 
human trafficking as a form of slavery or forced prostitution. However, he still focuses on 
trafficking in women for sexual exploitation and ignores the trafficking of women in the 
agricultural or industrial sectors, or with respect to mail-order brides or human organs. Moreover, 
this conception emphasizes only trafficking in women but does not take into account the much 
broader question of the migration of cheap labor, both male and female.  Many definitions of HT 
start to appear due to the fact that more and more people realize the activity of HT. Finally, the 
	 10	
United Nation provides the most prominent definition of HT in its 2000 trafficking protocol, also 
referred to as the Palermo Protocol.  
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or 
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.” (Palermo, 2000) 
The Protocol provides a significant foundation for a general definition of HT; however, some 
scholars argue that this definition does not give a well explained distinction between human 
trafficking and human smuggling.  
 Human Trafficking & Smuggling 
         The terms “human trafficking” and “human smuggling” are often thought of as 
interchangeable due to their similar characteristics of irregular migration and the clandestine 
movement of people. UN Protocols are the first attempts to differentiate between human 
trafficking and human smuggling, and provide a significant foundation for a general definition of 
these terms. Although the Protocols highlight fundamental differences, they fail to expand further 
specific distinctions between HT and human smuggling. UN defines smuggling as “the 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident.” (Palermo, 2000) This protocol establishes smuggling as a mutual financial agreement, 
between the smuggler and migrant. The agreement is to allow illegal transport of a person across 
an international border.  
          Comparing to HT, the most distinct characteristic of human smuggling is that human 
smuggling contains individual’s voluntaries. Smuggling definitions imply a voluntary nature 
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where the smuggler and migrant enter into some kinds of a contract to illegally transport 
migrants for a profit. On the contrary, trafficking definitions imply a significant involuntary 
nature where the trafficker and the victim only enter an arrangement through coercion, force or 
exploitation. UN definitions provide a great foundation for understanding the basic difference 
between these two terms. However, UN’s definitions neglect the different organizational 
dynamics in which smuggling and trafficking operate (Carolyn, 2010).  
Transnational crime is usually associated with the notion of hierarchical organized crime 
structures that execute operations. However, smuggling is different, it operates on an individual 
level or within loosely structured smuggling networks (Carolyn, 2010). These small-scale 
operations are carries out by independent actors. Smugglers assist migrants, migrants assist 
relatives, and relatives return to the smuggler to emigrate. The smuggler is encouraged to do his 
or her job well in order to retain business.  
As Carolyn (2010) notes that, in comparison, trafficking uses highly organized crime 
structures. Instead of operating within a loose framework of one or two individuals who carry out 
operations on a small-scale level, trafficking operates within a complicated system of varying 
levels of power. Comparing to smuggling, trafficking is more like a business. In addition to their 
organizational differences, smuggling and trafficking further vary in their purposes. Human 
smuggling has a mutually voluntary participation from both the migrant and the smuggler. 
Individuals involved are looking for either a better life or political asylum. A smuggler enters 
into a contract with a migrant to receive compensation for his or her services during the illegal 
immigration. Whether it is for the purpose of better work or political asylum, smuggled migrants 
voluntarily enter into a contract with a smuggler to escape from their home countries and to 
embrace a better life.  
	 12	
However, human trafficking always occurs within the forms of forced sex and forced 
labor. Women and children are the most vulnerable to being trafficked for sex. They are 
transported illegally, unwillingly, and sometimes unknowingly within a specific country or 
across international borders (Carolyn, 2010, p105). Labor trafficking is similarly conducted, but 
with a wider pool of victim, which includes male, female, and child labor. HT is based on 
deception, bribery, and bondage, making traffickers the only beneficiaries. 
Another flaw in UN definitions of smuggling and trafficking is that the trafficking 
protocols address the exploitative nature of trafficking but the smuggling protocols fail to address 
the potential for smuggling to use exploitation to increase profits, blackmail migrants, or get 
involved into involuntary trafficking. This broad generalization of human trafficking and human 
smuggling is only further reinforced by current literature’s failure to recognize that smuggled 
migrants are highly vulnerable to exploitation as well. Either in the case of human smuggling or 
in the case of human trafficking, smuggled individuals or trafficked individuals are always more 
vulnerable than smugglers or traffickers. Ultimately, the line between these two crimes cannot be 
easily drawn, no matter how great the differences between the two crimes are. This paper will 
focus on well-organized transnational human trafficking groups that transport victims who are 
unwillingly and unknowingly to gain huge profits.  
 
Patterns of HT  
Trafficking of human beings or a contemporary manifestation of slavery has been a 
global problem for decades. The problem of human trafficking is not limited in certain countries 
like India, Romania and Bangladesh, but a more general global issue occurred in countries in 
Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the US, the Middle and Eastern Europe. According to UNDOC’s 
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(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 2016 report, the crime of trafficking in persons 
affects virtually every country in every region of the world. More than 500 different trafficking 
flows were detected between 2012 and 2014. Between 2010 and 2012, victims with 152 different 
citizenships were detected in 124 countries across the globe. Most HT victims hold different 
citizenships in the country where they are identified as victims. There are 34% of overall victims 
were trafficked within national borders, 37% of them were trafficked cross-border within same 
sub region, 3% of them were trafficked form nearby sub region, and 26% of them are 
transregional. These victims, more than 6 in 10 of all victims, have been trafficked across at least 
one national border and this fact indicates that human trafficking is more like an international 
crime rather than domestic criminal activity. Due to its clandestine nature, the data collected of 
HT victims is probably highly underrated.  
Over the last 10 years, the profile of detected trafficking victims has changed. Although 
most detected victims are still women, children and men now make up larger shares of the total 
number of victims than they did a decade ago. In 2014, children comprised 28 per cent of 
detected victims, and men comprised 21 per cent. With the significant increases in the share of 
men among detected trafficking victims, the share of victims who are trafficked for forced labor 
has also increased. About 4 in 10 victims detected between 2012 and 2014 were trafficked for 
forced labor, and 63 per cent were men. People are trafficked for many exploitative purposes. 
Trafficking for sexual exploitation and for forced labor are the most prominently detected forms, 
but trafficking victims can also be used as beggars, for forced marriages, benefit fraud, 
production of pornography or for organ removal (UNODC, 2016).  The increasing diversity of 
HT victims indicates that the trafficking crime has evolved with expanding forms of exploitation 
and more complicated transnational crime organization.   
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The actions of combating HT  
     The number of countries, with laws that criminalize most forms of trafficking in persons 
with the definition used by the UN Protocol 2000, increased from 33 in 2003 (18 per cent) to 158 
(88 per cent) in 2016 (UNODC). This rapid progress means that more countries start to be aware 
of the problem of HT and are willing to put effort into combatting HT. As the world’s second 
largest destination/maker (after Germany) for women and children trafficked for purpose of 
sexual exploitation in the sex industry (Mizus, 2003), the United States has taken steps to combat 
HT. In October 2001, the US State Department created the Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, which published an annual report assessing global efforts to combat 
trafficking in persons. Funding for counter-trafficking programs has also increased substantially 
in recent years. For instance, in 2003, the US Government alone supported 190 anti-trafficking 
programs in 92 countries, totaling US $72 million (US Government, 2004).  
Europe, as another crucial HT destination, is actively devoting efforts into the process of 
preventing human trafficking as well. The organization of the largest European Union (EU) 
conference on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, was held in Brussels in 
September 2002. The conference is one example of the political priority being accorded to 
combating HT, bringing together more than 1,000 representatives of European institutions, EU 
Member States, candidate countries, and relevant developing countries drawn from local 
governments, international organizations, and NGOs. The conference outlines a set of policy 
recommendations for the EU in the area of HT. The Commission subsequently appointed an 
Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings and is currently preparing a new Communication 
on Trafficking in Human Beings, which will set out the Commission’s approach to prevent HT.  
During the past decade, trafficking has also become a growing problem in South-East 
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Asia. It has been conservatively estimated that at least 200-225,000 women and children from 
South-East Asia are trafficked annually (Aslihan, 2012). China, as the leading power in the 
region of South-East Asia, has taken positive actions in order to fight against HT. Trafficking 
offences is described in Chines legal frameworks, and is criminalized under Article 240 of the 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. To improve cooperation between various 
government departments, an Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting Mechanism was established, 
comprising 31 members of the Communist Party and government ministries. An Anti-Trafficking 
Office was also set up by the Ministry of Public Security to lead its anti-trafficking work and 
coordinate IMJMM members. Cooperative mechanisms at the local, provincial and country level, 
are gradually being established. Moreover, with the support of other ministries and NGOs, the 
Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Civil Affairs had begun to provide protection and 
shelter to HT victims. China has a total of 1,375 administration and relief shelters and over 200 
Child Protection Centers located in cities across the country, which provide temporary support 
for trafficking victims.  
However, although in a global-scale, countries begin to take actions to combat human 
trafficking, most national legislation is recent, having been introduced during the last 8 to 10 
years. As a result, the average number of convictions still remains low, indicating that the 
majority countries are still in the early stage of combating human trafficking. It takes time and 
dedicated resources for a national criminal justice system to acquire sufficient expertise to detect, 
investigate and successfully prosecute cases of trafficking in persons. Not to mention the 
problem of corruption and government enforcement of certain legislative framework. In general, 
there is a long way to go in the issue of combating HT.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework  
 
Literature Reviews  
  There is plenty of literature that addresses the issue of globalization and human 
trafficking but they mainly focus on the nexus of these two phenomena. Bales (2004) highlights 
a modern form of a slavery attributable to three interrelated factors: 1) a population explosion, 2) 
economic globalization and modernized agriculture, and 3) rapid economic change in developing 
countries. Bales (2005) further provides a working definition of globalization, which is a process 
that, in part, disseminates practices, values, technology, and other human products throughout the 
globe. He indicates that economic globalization and the facilitation of trade internationally has 
contributed a great deal to the trafficking of humans across state boundaries. Joshi (2002) 
discusses that the economic “toll” on the third world created by globalization and 
industrialization of former agriculture societies, and that how women in particular become more 
vulnerable in transitional economies of developing countries. Therefore, capitalist globalization 
is in part responsible for the increasing incidence of HT. Chastain (2006) also points out that free 
trade agreements between nation states exacerbate the existing deficiencies in underdeveloped 
countries where state institutions are weak and economic performance is poor. The author 
presents statistics indicating that both poverty and number of victims of HT increased in Mexico 
after a free trade agreement that was signed with the US. The economic globalization has 
downsides for underdeveloped countries.  
Polakoff (2007) discusses the impact of economic globalization on low income families 
in the underdeveloped regions of the world. The article underscores the crucial role that children 
in the third world play in supporting their families, and assigns blame for this undesirable 
phenomenon to underlying processes of economic globalization. Children have become 
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commodities on the global labor, agriculture, and sex markets. The author further argues that 
economic globalization has created a form of “global apartheid” resulting in a fourth world 
where it has millions of homeless, incarcerated, impoverished, and otherwise socially excluded 
people. Jonathan (2007) proposed the startling notion that slavery may be one of the most 
representative consequences of global capitalism. He highlights a basic supply and demand 
phenomenon of the global market. There is a surplus of individuals that are trafficked to more 
affluent regions of the world to perform highly demanding duties or jobs at minimal expense.  
Biemann (2002) suggests that globalization is a “gendered” process that, in particular, 
makes women the most vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking. Barid (2007) reports on the 
trafficking of women sold into sexual slavery, and describes the cunning tactics used to trick 
women into sex slaves. The author believes that the sex trade, a worldwide epidemic, has 
developed since the mid-1990s and conveys the negative consequences of economic 
globalization and its potential promotion of sex trafficking. The author provides a comprehensive 
analysis of globalization and its detrimental socio-economic repercussions that increase 
vulnerability to trafficking within certain demographics. Kantarci (2007) asserts that improved 
communication and transportation due to globalization has facilitated the emergence of sexual 
trafficking since sex work is the only available work for poor women in third world countries, 
and that prostitution for them is a survival strategy. All of the above scholars believe that either 
globalization is the determinate cause for HT to happen, or it makes the crime easier to conduct. 
The following literature, on the other hand, argues that globalization actually is a determinate 
factor of combating HT. 
Bertone (2004) focuses on transnational efforts to combat trafficking. He mentions three 
themes: 1) sex trafficking vs. labor trafficking, 2) legalization vs. abolition, and 3) supply vs. 
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demand. He gives credit to international NGOs for campaigns to clamp down on violence against 
women for having a positive effect in the global campaign to combat trafficking. Moreover, he 
believes that the cooperation between different international organizations makes the action of 
combating HT more efficient. However, he is also concerns that hierarchical global governance 
structure and corrupt local governments will impede the progress of global anti-human 
trafficking. Mameli (2002) addressed that transnational police organizations can play the role to 
prevent and investigate activities of the global HT industry. Specifically, he proposes how 
domestic governments and international governmental organizations, like the UN, are working 
together and bringing this issue from a local scale to a global perspective. Ndiaye (2007) also 
states how the International Organization of Migration (IOM), and its many partners worldwide 
provide assistance with shelters for physical and psychological health care, legal consulting, and 
voluntary return and reintegration assistance to empower victims once they have returned home.  
However, these publications neither analyze the role of globalization in the HT industry 
nor provide solid evidence on whether the increasing global integration can enhance a nation’s 
ability to combat HT. The following chapter will discuss the role of globalization on HT, using a 
general demand & supply model.  
Understand the HT industry  
In order to understand the operations of HT industry, we should first understand the 
organization and steps of HT. Different types of buyers constructed a huge base of demand for 
HT market. However, without the flaws of law enforcement and networks in the destination 
countries, it is unlikely for traffickers to illegally transport HT victims from original countries to 
destination countries. In the border migration literature, scholars often aim to establish path for 
migration or networks influencing the cost-benefit analysis. Following this logic, there should be 
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some types of connections or networks that also have an impact on the location from which 
people are trafficked. In this case, countries that have a more established immigrant network in 
the host state will have higher numbers of human trafficking victims than those that do not have 
established immigration networks. Geographical proximity and the corruption level in the 
destination countries also affect the operation of human trafficking since these factors may 
influence the decisions of the traffickers by altering operational and criminal costs. (Wheaton, 
2010) Under such mechanism, a country with open borders or a more flexible travelling Visa 
policy in destination countries should be easier to operate HT. Noted that a more flexible 
traveling Visa policy and relatively open border do not necessary represent that it is easy to 
conduct legal migration, since if the legal migration is easy to achieve, there would be no reason 
for HT activities occurred. Finally, the countries that exert anti-trafficking policies and have 
strong capacity of achieving law empowerment should be tough for traffickers to conduct HT 
operations.  
Recruitment is the first step in trafficking. It is at stage to make those unemployed 
women become victims. Transportation is the second step in trafficking that exports the victims 
from source countries to destination countries. The methods of transporting depend upon 
geographical conditions and include illegally crossing borders. In this stage, traffickers have to 
be confident that their benefit will be substantial as to pay the cost of using transportations like 
ships or cars, accommodation, and most importantly the fee of false documents, bribery for 
officials and potential criminal punishments. The third and final stage of trafficking occurs when 
the victim reaches the destination, allowing her exploitation to begin and from this stage, and this 
is the stage that allows the traffickers start to earn money. Exploitation is the main objective of 
trafficking and can take the form of sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery and household 
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servitude. In the case of sexual exploitation, traffickers usually rely on networks of trusted hotel 
owners or people who are willing to rent accommodations to them and started the business by 
providing sexual services.  
Economic Model  
Economists model the labor supply decisions based on the individual’s choice of whether 
to supply labor. In the market of human trafficking, the labor supply focuses on the outcome of 
the commercial exploitation rather than individual’s choice, but this fact does not change the 
principle and theory of the economic model. This paper will mainly focus on the market of 
commercial sex exploitation and will use Wheaton (2010)’s model of human trafficking as an 
illumination. Since the economic model is a simplification of reality and due to the complex 
nature of human trafficking for instance, variables like moral standard, cultural impact, and 
corruption could be difficult to address. This model is more like a general guideline of the illicit 
market. 
 Economic models are by necessity based on assumptions. Wheaton addresses the human 
trafficking market as a monopolistic competition with the following assumptions: 1) the human 
trafficking market is a single market, 2) There are many producers (traffickers) and many 
consumers (buyers), 3) There is a product differentiation- competition is strong and consumer 
switching occurs. 4) Traffickers have some control over price – they are price makers not price 
takers; however, the elasticity of demand is higher than monopoly. 5) The barriers to entry and 
exit the human trafficking market are low. The monopolistic competition model well explained 
the HT (human trafficking) market and some assumptions are reasonable since first of all there 
are many traffickers in this illicit market and these traffickers could choose to enter the market or 
exit the market based on the revenue of trafficking with a very low cost. Secondly as Bales 
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(2005) points out that the human trafficking market could be characterized by product 
differentiation since the “attributes vary according to the jobs or economic sectors in which the 
retail consumer intends to use the trafficked person.” Moreover, the nature of product 
differentiation empowers traffickers with some control power over negotiation and price (Bales, 
2005). 
Price of trafficked victim  
P’ 
 
 
 
                                                     Quantity of HT victims 
  
 
  
                                                                                 
 
                                  Graph-1 
Shown as graph one, like every other demand curve, the demand of trafficking victims 
has a downward sloping demand curve since buyers are more likely to buy trafficking victims’ 
service when the price of the service is low and there is no supply curve since the traffickers are 
price makers but not price takers. In figure one at or above the P’, the buyers could use legitimate 
labor since they could not gain benefit from using illegal trafficked labor. As a result, the buyers 
would only be willing to buy service from trafficked victims when the price is below P’.  
Like traditional costs of producing a product, human trafficking also faces monetary and 
physical cost but unlike traditional market, it also faces psychological and criminal (risk of being 
caught and severity of punishment) cost, cost of moving individuals from source countries to 
destination countries, transportation cost (traveling fee for victims and their household) and cost 
for falsified documents. In sum, the total cost for traffickers to traffic victims includes total fix 
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cost, which is the cost of establishing network and routes, recurring bribes, and forged falsified 
government document and total variable cost, which is the cost of transportation, traveling and 
household. Due to the high fix cost, ATC would be high at the low quantity of trafficking and 
would decrease as the operations increase to a certain point. Because the average variable cost 
would increase with the operations and size of trafficked victims, the AVC curve would be 
upward sloping. Following this logic, the ATC should first be downward sloping and then be 
upward sloping. Moreover, the marginal cost for trafficking an additional individual victim 
should be upward sloping since MC increases with the number of victims due to the fact that it is 
more difficult and costly to commit illegal migration with a larger group of people rather than a 
single one.  
In the short run, any price offered to buy an individual victim above the ATC would 
encourage traffickers to continue their trafficking activities. A trafficker will choose the quantity 
of individuals to traffic based upon maximizing profit. In the monopoly competition model, 
economists model the maximizing profit as the point when marginal cost meets marginal 
benefits. The marginal revenue, the additional revenue from the last unit supplied, curved for the 
HT market should be downward sloping. This is because at a low quantity, the trafficker could 
set a high price for the trafficked victim and with the more trafficked labor occurred in the 
market, the buyer would be less willing to pay a higher price for the trafficked people. The 
equilibrium or profit maximizing quantity shows as graph 2 as Q*. The equilibrium price of HT 
in a monopolistic competitive model is when the Q* meets the demand curve of HT, shown in 
graph 2 as P*. The profit under this circumstance is Q* times P* subtract ATC times Q*, shown 
in graph 2 as shadowed area.  
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Graph-2 
However, there are certain flaws of Wheaton’s monopolistic competitive model: 1) they 
do not address a supply curve due to the nature of monopoly but in practice even with certain 
product differentiation, the traffickers could not set up their own prices since there are too many 
traffickers exert the similar exploitations, 2) The “business” of human trafficking has a high fix 
cost since a human trafficking conduct requires sources of victims, a network within destination 
countries for letting victims illegally pass the border of destination countries, a demand side, 
transportation and household. It should not be easy for traffickers to enter the market, but it 
should be relatively easy to exit the market because the high fix cost is due to HT’s criminal 
nature and the cost for traffickers of getting out of the business is not unreachable.  
This paper will address the model of demand and supply in human trafficking market 
with the assumptions (1) to (3) from Wheaton’s model and a supply curve. The illicit market 
should be represented as Graph 3, where the price of victims of HT is represented on the vertical 
axis and where the quantity of victims is represented on the horizontal axis. As always, the 
demand curve is downward sloping since with the increase of price of HT victims, the demand 
would decrease. The supply curve is upward sloping since with the increase of price of HT 
victims, the traffickers are more willing to conduct HT. The supply and demand would adjust to 
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the equilibrium level, where the demand equals to the supply, and the equilibrium point is where 
demand curve meets supply curve, shown as Q* and P*. This fact indicates that all supplied of 
victims from traffickers would be efficiently sold to brothel-owners or consumers. 
 
         It is important to note that in this framework, the demand and supply model is a general 
equilibrium model, in which the market is a single market and traffickers (suppliers) behave 
competitively. It means that they take prices as given. In theory, this market could be estimated 
empirically qs = α + βP, where β is positive and the partial derivative of P should also be positive. 
However in reality, it is almost impossible at the present stage to estimate this equation because 
first of all, in practice the assumption of competitive market could not be held. Secondly, more 
crucially, the observable transaction, between “selling” and “buying” HT victims, is very 
obscure. Recruiters and the exploiters often belong to the same trafficking networks and 
organizations that involve investors, transporters, corrupt officials, informers, guides, debt 
collectors, money launderers and commercial sex establishments. (Aronositz, 2001) The whole 
process of HT is illegal and clandestine. There is no solid empirical evidence that could be used 
to analyze the price of victims so that this model cannot be interpreted by data and cannot be 
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estimated.  
    However, the principle and logic of this model still stand, and since HT is a market it is a 
rational choice for traffickers to maximize the profits. The profit of the HT is generated by the 
economic exploitation of victims throughout the traffic chain, including debt payment, as well as 
revenues from the commercial sexual activities of the victims. The profit applied to the equation 
we had in the previous paper should be:  𝜋 = pq – c(q) – f 
The Role of Globalization in the Economic Model of HT 
Supply Side 
– For Victims 
The globalization will have three major impacts on human trafficking victims: 
1) Increased information of global situation and potential destination countries allows 
potential trafficking victims to have incentive to migrate and therefore provides 
traffickers the opportunity to deceive them. However, increased information also allows 
potential trafficking victims to be aware of the risk of being trafficked.  
2) Increased international cooperation between the local government and international 
governmental organizations will help to protect potential vulnerable victims.  
3) Global integration will change the economic performance of certain source countries; 
however, the impact remains ambiguous.  
In general, the impact of globalization on potential victims is not straightforward, however, 
victims are not the “producer” of the human trafficking industry. Traffickers are the decisive 
decision makers of supply side in the HT industry.  
 
	 26	
– For Traffickers 
Globalization will have four major impacts on human trafficking 
1) Increased information will help traffickers target venerable victims. 
2) Convenient communication among countries helps to build migrant networks in the 
destination countries. Moreover, with a more open border, the cost of traffickers to send 
victims to destination countries will decrease. 
3) Increased international cooperation between the local government and international 
governmental organizations will make crime of HT relatively hard to conduct.  
4) Globalization will increase trafficker’s incentive to traffic sine each additional victim is 
more valuable1. 
In general, globalization will increase trafficker’s incentive to traffic more potential victims. 
Therefore, the supply curve in the Graph-3 should shift to the right, as the following graph.  
 
  Price of victims                       Supply from traffickers  
                                                                                               S’ 
            P 
            P*                                                                     Demand  
  
Quantity of victims  
                                                                Q            Q* 
                                                           Graph-4 
         From above graph, the new equilibrium should be at P* & Q*. Therefore, it 
																																																						
1		Although the risk of being detected has increased, the actual cost of trafficking humans does not increase. 
Moreover, due to the fact that the risk of detected has increased, the value of trafficking one additional victim will 
increase.  
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represents that globalization will cause an incense in quantity of HT victims and a decrease in 
price of HT victims.  
Demand Side  
Traditional market theory operates on the presumption that demand creates supply, 
however in the case of the market of HT, the relationship between supply and demand is 
ambiguous and they are intricately interwoven. Whether the demand for sexual exploitation 
creates HT supply or the large amount of unskilled illegal immigrated women and girls who 
could provide certain services generates the demand for such services and labor, there is a large 
demand side to the market of human trafficking existed. And the factors on this side, the large 
demand push for greater number of people to be forced into the trafficking industry.  
Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) in its 2014 
Preventing Trafficking in Persons by Addressing Demand, highlights that end consumers are 
generally not directly complicit in supporting sexual or labor exploitation, usually lacking 
sufficient knowledge on which to make an informed choice. Similarly, many companies may not 
be aware of exploitative labor practices that are conducting in their organizations. Increased 
global integration represent increased international information, which will help them to better 
distinguish HT victims. Moreover, since if a country is more open, it would be easier to conduct 
regular legal migration in the country. The legal migrants, from underdeveloped countries and 
poor living conditions, will create a large supply side in the field of cheap labor and even sexual 
businesses. Therefore, globalization will cause a decrease in the demand side of HT industry, 
indicating that the Demand curve from Graph shifts to the left.  
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      From the above graph, the final equilibrium point is where new demand curve (D’) meets 
new supply curve (S’), shown as Q** and P**. It is obvious in the graph that demand and supply 
curve shift to opposite directions. Since the final equilibrium point depends on the magnitude of 
how much the two curves shift, theoretically we could not conclude the final impact of 
globalization in the industry of HT. Therefore, we need a solid empirical research to show the 
role of globalization in the HT market.  
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Chapter III: Empirical Research  
How to measure a country’s ability to stop Human Trafficking --- the dependent variable 
This empirical analysis aims to study whether increasing global integration enhances the 
ability of nations to combat Human Trafficking. Since Human Trafficking is a criminal and 
illegal organized activity, it is therefore not overly surprising that the available data has been 
found to be limited due to its nature of concealment. Thus, in this project, the measurement of 
nation’s differential ability to combat HT does not come from accurate numbers of HT victims 
and traffickers. This paper will use the tier placements from the Trafficking in Persons Report 
that is released from the U.S. Department of State to measure a country’s ability to combat HT.  
   The U.S. Department of State, has released Trafficking in Persons Report annually from 
2001 to 2016. In the annual report, the Department placed each country into one of four tiers, as 
mandated by the TVPA (The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000). This placement is 
based more on the extent of government action to combat trafficking rather than on the size of 
the country’s problem. The analyses are based on the extent of the government’s efforts 
measured against the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, 
which are generally consistent with the Palermo Protocol. TVPA requires the government of a 
country: 
(1) to prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts of such trafficking. 
(2) to make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.  
(3) to prescribe punishment for the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving 
force, fraud, coercion, victims of sex trafficking that are children incapable of giving meaningful 
consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which causes a death. 
(4) to prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the 
	 30	
heinous nature of the offense of the knowing commission of any act of severe forms of 
trafficking in persons. (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Div. A of Pub. L. No. 106-
386, § 108, as amended.) 
Tier rankings and narratives reflect an assessment of: enactment of laws prohibiting 
severe forms of trafficking in persons, strict penalties for traffickers, implementation of HT laws, 
providing government funding and partnerships with NGO, protection provided to HT victims, 
governmental measures to prevent HT, and efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts 
and international sex tourism. There are in general four tiers in the report. Tier 1 rankings 
indicate that a government has acknowledged the existence of human trafficking, has made 
efforts to address the problem, and meets the TVPA’s minimum standards. Each year, 
governments need to demonstrate appreciating progress in combating trafficking to maintain a 
Tier 1 ranking. Tier 2 rankings indicate that a government does not fully meet TVPA’s minimum 
standards but are making significant efforts to meet those standards. Tier 2 watch list rankings 
indicate that a government tries to make significant efforts to meet the standards; however, the 
country’s absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is large or is significantly 
increasing, there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat HT from the 
previous year, or country is planning to make the progress in the following years. Tier 3 rankings 
indicate that a government does not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards and is not making 
significant efforts to do so.  
For the dependent variable, I use the U.S. Trafficking in Person Report from 2002 to 
2008 to generate a list of all the countries (total 198 countries) in alphabetical order with their 
tier placements. The following graphs show that the tier placement based on region2 and the 
																																																						
2	In order to show the tier placement in different regions, I first I sorted different countries as their continent and 
then took the average of every country’s tier placement from 2002 to 2016. 
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worst five countries that, according to TVPA, have to take more actions to eliminate human 
trafficking in person.  
According to Graph 6 & 7 (see Appendix), European countries have the best performance 
regarding to the issue of combating human trafficking and none of the worst five performing 
countries is from Europe. On the contrary, the majority countries in Asia and Africa do not meet 
the TVPA’s requirements and need to demonstrate greater effort in the issue of combating human 
trafficking. This is especially for African countries since three out of five of five worst 
performing countries are from Africa.  
 
Measurements of globalization 
Global integration is a broad concept and has been used to describe a variety of 
phenomena, which includes the economic, social and even political interdependence of countries 
(Devin, 2010). There is no universally accepted measurement for global integration. In order to 
have an unbiased result, this paper will use three different measurements of globalization, which 
are trade openness, net FDI and globalization index. Both trade openness and net FDI are 
measured from the economic perspective and the globalization index is a more general 
measurement.  
Trade openness measures how large the influence of trade is on domestic activities. In 
other words, it is the trade percentage of GDP, calculated as the sum of imports and exports and 
divided by GDP. It is a measurement that observes whether a country has an outward-oriented 
economy or an inward-oriented economy and it thus could be a valuable measurement of global 
integration since a country with an outward-oriented economy would be more globalized.  
Another possible measurement in this case is net FDI. According to the IMF’s Balance of 
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Payments Manual (1993), the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) has three components: equity 
investment, reinvested earnings, and short- and long-term inter-company loans between parent 
firms and foreign affiliates (IMF, 1993). FDI is recorded on a directional basis. FDI net inflows 
by definition are the value of inward direct investment made by non-resident investors in the 
reporting economy. In other words, inward FDI is when foreign capital is invested locally. Only a 
country with a stable and healthy economy and political environment would attract more foreign 
investments. FDI net inflows is a reasonable measurement of global integration since it shows 
the country’s international financial flows and its economy status3. 
The globalization index comes from KOF Globalization Index where they measure the 
three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social and political. Table – 1 in Appendix, 
presents the general statistical characters of these three measurements.  
 
Ordered Logit Regression & Panel Data Analysis 
           Four Tiers represent four different levels of the actions a country takes regarding to the 
issue of combating HT. This paper will use this measurement as the dependent variable to 
analyze the relationship between global integration and the nation’s action of preventing HT. 
Since the tier placement is ordinal variables and when dependent variables are ordinal rather than 
continuous, conventional OLS regression techniques are inappropriate. The logit model, also 
known as the proportional odds model, is a popular method in such cases. Moreover, in the case 
of the tier placement, tier one to tier three represent the level of combating HT from “satisfied” 
to “unsatisfied”. The ordinal variables going down the ordinal scale and therefore the ordinal 
variables are in a certain order. Hence, this project will use the ordered logit regression as the 
																																																						
3	Both data of trade openness and net FDI come from World Bank database.  
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model.  
       The model is based on the cumulative probabilities of the response variable. In particular, 
the logit of each cumulative probability is assumed to be a linear function of the covariates with 
regression coefficients constant across response categories (Schaafsma and Osoba, 1994). This 
model is first considered by Peter McCullagh (1980), in order to use statistical method to analyze 
qualitative measurement, which whether subjective or objective, usually take values in a limited 
set of categories which may be on an ordinal or on a purely nominal scale (McCullagh, 1980). As 
noted by McCullagh, ologit is tempting to analyze ordinal outcomes with the linear regression 
model, assuming equal distances between categories.  
The model is based on consideration of the cumulative distribution probabilities, 𝛾$ =Pr	(𝑦 ≤ 𝑗) and takes the form: 
logit (𝛾$) = logit(𝛾$/(1 − 𝛾$)) 
In the ordered logit model, the ordinal dependent variable, denoted here by y, is viewed 
as the realization of an underlying, latent continuous random variable, 𝑦∗. Moreover, 𝑦∗ would 
satisfy a linear regression model, that is: 𝑦∗ = 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀 
This paper aims to find whether globalization can help to prevent HT or not. In this way, the 
independent variable should be the measurements of globalization, which are trade openness, 
globalization index and net FDI. The equations should thus be: 
(1) 𝑦∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠	+𝜀 
(2) 𝑦∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥	+𝜀 
(3) 𝑦∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼+𝜀 
Since the impact of globalization shows with the changing of time and this paper aims to 
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conclude a rather general conclusion that is not limited in one country, neither time-series nor 
cross-section alone could answer the question proposed by this paper. Thus, this paper will use 
panel data, which consists of comparable time series data observed on a variety of units and 
which is one that follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple 
observations on each individual in the sample. The panel data analysis methods applied in the 
study of comparative political economy, where the units are countries and where for each 
country we observe annual data on a variety of political and economic variables. Panel data 
involves two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension N, and a time-series dimension T. Panel 
data provides the possibility of generating more accurate predictions for individual outcomes 
than time-series data or cross-sectional data alone (Cheng Hsiao, 2003). As noted by Hsiao 
(1995), if individuals’ behaviors are similar in their conditions which are related to certain 
variables, panel data provides the possibility of learning an individual’s behavior by observing 
the behavior of others. Thus, a more accurate description of an individual’s behavior can be 
obtained by using both cross-section and the time-series.  
This data set is a micro-panel data set that is a panel for which the time dimension T is 
largely less than the individual dimension N (with 198 countries observed since 2002), T << N. 
Since the panel data have two-dimensions, the equations we generalized above should be 
modified as: 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑥HI+𝜀HI 
where, i = 1, …., 198, t = 1, …, 14 
Simple Ordered Logit Regression 
         According to the above statement, the equation for the circumstances that globalization is 
the only independent variable in the model, should be: 
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(1) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠HI	+𝜀HI 
(2) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6globalization	indexHI+𝜀HI 
(3) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6net	FDI	HI+𝜀HI 
The results of equation (1) is showing by Table-2 in Appendix. 
The first section of this table is literation log. Ordered logistic regression, like binary and 
multinomial logistic regression, uses maximum likelihood estimation, which is an iterative 
procedure. The first iteration that called iteration 0 is the log likelihood of the “null” model, 
which is a model with no explanatory variables. At the next iteration (iteration 1), the 
explanatory variables are included in the model. The log likelihood increases with the increase of 
the iterations, and when the difference between successive iteration is very small, the iterating 
stops, and the results are displayed. As this table shows, iteration 2 & 3 have the same log 
likelihood.  
According to Table-2, Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, showing 
that at least one of the regression coefficients in this model is not equal to zero, which represents 
that there is a statistical relationship between the explanatory variable and response variable. The 
coefficient between trade openness and tier placement is -0.0033726. Unlike conventional OLS 
model where the coefficient indicates that for every additional changing in the explanatory 
variable there is a certain expected change in the dependent variable, the interpretation of the 
ordered logit coefficient is that for every additional changing in the explanatory variable, the 
dependent variable level is expected to change by its respective regression coefficient in the 
ordered log-odds scale while the other variables in the model are held constant. In other words, 
the numeral number of the coefficient is not important, the sign shows the relationship between 
the explanatory variable and dependent variable. From Table-2, trade openness has a positive 
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relationship with the tier placement. Since tiers are placed in a degrading order of behaviors, 
with the higher the tier, the lower the nation’s capacity of preventing HT and therefore, the trade 
openness has a positive impact of combating HT.   
Before generating the conclusion, we also have to observe the test statistics and p-value 
to see whether the result is statistically significant or not. The test statistic z is the ration of 
coefficient to the standard error of the explanatory variable. The z value follows a standard 
normal distribution which is used to test against a two-sided alternative hypothesis that the 
coefficient is not equal to zero. Two-tail p-values test the hypothesis that each coefficient is 
different from 0. To reject this, the p-value has to be lower than 0.05 (for a 95% confidence), and 
as showing as Table-2, the P-value is 0.000 that represents the result is statistically significant or 
to say that the explanatory variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable. In 
conclusion, trade openness has a positive relationship with the nation’s ability of combating HT.  
The results of equation (2) & (3) show in Table 3 & 4 in Appendix. As the Table-2, the P 
value and chi2 test in Table-3 & 4 also show that the results are statically significant and 
according to the coefficient, it is clear that both globalization index and net FDI have a positive 
relationship with nation’s capacity of preventing HT. All three measurements of globalization 
show the positive relationship with the nation’s effort of combating HT. However, we could not 
conclude that global integration would enhance the nation’s ability to combat HT in this stage 
since this paper acknowledges that global integration is not the only factor that could affect the 
country’s capacity of preventing HT. Therefore, the following section will introduce control 
variables to this model. 
Control Variables  
Extreme poverty, lack of economic opportunities, civil injustice, and political uncertainty, 
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are factors that all contribute to an environment that encourages human trafficking and 
smuggling. Economic push factors are always addressed as the decisive factors of human 
trafficking due to its nature of expressing fundamental living conditions. These factors are that 
people experience around them where they live: lack of economic opportunities, low living 
standards, demographic growth, and political repression (Castles 2003). And these factors highly 
augment people’s willingness to pursue a better living condition, the desire of living in richer 
countries and the strong eagerness of moving away from the old poor living environment 
misguides people to believe traffickers’ fraud. The economic push factors influence all types of 
migrations in general and human trafficking in particular since a poor living condition is decisive 
to inciting trafficking. Economic factors not only enhance the possibility of conducting HT but 
also are determinations of a country’s ability of combating HT.  
GPD per capita & GDP annual growth rate  
One prevalent way to measure a country’s overall economic performance is the 
measurement of gross domestic product per capita. Although both Ivan (2013) and Jac-Kucharski 
(2012) found that there is only a weak statistically non-important negative relationship between 
GDP per capita of source countries and identified HT victims, they could only address the result 
that GDP per capita alone offer only an incomplete explanation for the numbers of human 
trafficking victims from source country but not conclude that the economic performances of 
source countries have no impact on HT. GDP annual growth rate is another measurement of a 
country’s recent economy performance. It measures how fast the economy is growing and is a 
significant indicator of economic health and the future trend of the country’s economy. A country 
with greater GDP per capita and GDP annual growth rate should be more capable of preventing 
HT.  
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Economic disparity and inequality  
Besides the overall economic performance, the economic disparity in a state would also 
be a decisive pushing factor, which stimulates HT activities. Inequality as a whole has great 
impact on human rights violations in general and is also a strong motivation for victims to 
migrate. Higher economic disparity in a state should be associated with higher numbers of HT 
victims. Jack-Kucharski (2012) found a statistically positive relationship between 2002 Gini 
Index, which rangers from zero to 100, where zero represents perfect equality and 100 represents 
perfect inequality, and number of HT victims. The more inequality occurred in a source country, 
the more HT victims are trafficked from the source country. The overall poor economic 
performance combined with high unemployment rate and huge economic disparity integrate 
people’s willingness to migration and traffickers to recruit victims. The country with greater 
inequality rate should be less capable of combating HT.  
However, the pure economic factors could not fully explain the human trafficking supply 
since not all poor countries have large number victims of HT, such as Bhutan and even some 
“developed” countries could be a source country for human trafficking like Russia. The 
government, which plays both the role of decision maker and the role of executor regarding the 
issue of HT, is a crucial determination of whether a country could take strong and powerful 
movement to combat HT.  
This paper will use the Gini index to calculate inequality. The Gini index is a 
measurement of the income distribution of a country’s residents. This number, which ranges 
between 0 and 1 and is based on residents’ net income, helps define the gap between the rich and 
the poor, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality. Since this 
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paper will use data from World Bank database, World Bank has another estimate of the Gini 
index, which they range from 0 to 100, where 0 represents perfect equality, while and index of 
100 implies perfect inequality.  
Institutional Disparity  
Country’s institutional and historical disparity also contribute to their ability to combat 
HT. Under its French colonial, Vietnam period had large trafficking networks that sold women 
and children within Vietnam or to China and Hong Kong, where they would ultimately be sold 
into marriage, prostitution, or domestic servitude. Lessard (2015) argues that colonialism 
exacerbates the human trafficking since it causes war, state monopolies on goods and opium, and 
social norms in which women and girls could be both priced and exploited, and therefore caused 
a black market that trade kidnapped women and girls flourished. Although there is a lack of other 
empirical evidence to show whether colonial history and human trafficking have a positive 
correlation in a wide range or not, following the case in Vietnam, similar grabber friendly 
colonial institutions will likely create a pool of victims of women and girls.  
Russia is another country that suffers from HT due to its historical institutional factors. 
Unlike other countries, which are either major destination countries or major source countries, 
Russia is a source, transit and destination country. A report of migration policy center in 2013 
exposed that there are approximately 30,000-60,000 women and children are taken from Russia 
mostly for prostitution. Moreover, according to the Office of United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, over the past two decades after the collapse of Soviet Union, over 500,000 
women were sold from Russia to other countries. Russia not only provides a huge amount of HT 
victims to global communities but also imports “human commodities”, primarily from the 
countries of the former Soviet Union (UNDOC, 2015). These “commodities” are used for slave 
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labor exploitation, in sweatshops, in the informal and shadow economy, and in the household. 
With its convenient position between east and west, the relative ease of crossing borders in the 
post-Soviet space, government official corruption, and the existences of criminal gangs, Russia 
has become a suitable transit spot for international criminal networks involved in smuggling and 
human trafficking. The traffickers use Russia for illegal migrant transit, primarily from Central, 
South and Southeast Asia to European Union member states.  
The human trafficking activities started to flourish with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which ended seventy years of centralized political and economic controls and fifty years of the 
social contract that guaranteed employment and social security for all. Half of Russian adults are 
out of work and only a quarter of those employed are getting paid on a regular basis. (Stoecker, 
2000) The population suffered from high unemployment and poverty, especially among women 
and children. These unemployed women and their kids flowed into the hands and coffers of 
criminal organizations, which sought to exploit the chaotic and tough situation by luring those 
desperate jobless women into forced prostitution, sweatshop labor and domestic servitude. 
Moreover, with the emergent of globalization, criminal organizations actively used the trend of 
international trade to export their “human capitals”. Human trafficking in Russia and the former 
Soviet Republics is a complex issue that is difficult to address. But, without question, the 
complex history of the Soviet Union, and relationships between Russia and Post-Soviet states are 
the dominant factors causing human trafficking.  
Since there is no numeral measurement of institutional disparity, this paper will use 
different political systems to express different forms of governments. There are five most 
common political systems around the world, which are democracy, republic, monarchy, 
communism and dictatorship. Within the five most common political systems, a democratic 
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political system is the system that least supports HT, since trafficking destroys the central tenets 
of democracy. Democracy establishes the right to protection under the law, guarantees human 
freedom, and establishes rights to citizens. HT is against all of these principles. Therefore, 
democracy and combating HT should have a positive relationship: where democratic political 
system would demonstrate greater effort to combat HT.  
Corruption 
Skeldon (2000) states that bureaucratic complexity and government corruption are factors 
that impede the legal mobility of labor and encourage human trafficking. An institution with 
incomplete legislation, an instable political environment and corruption government officials 
without a doubt would cause more human trafficking (Skeldon, 2000). Human trafficking is 
always considered as a high profit and relatively low risk venture. This cost-benefit equation 
exists because the traffickers have profound monetary gains compared to the limited risk of 
getting caught and being brought to trial (Nautze, 2006). Institutional corruption allows this 
perverse incentive to survive. Corruption allows the trafficking process to remain protected from 
prosecution and even helps traffickers to recruit victims. According to the Global Coalition 
Against Corruption’s 2011 working paper, Corruption assists the movements of victim within a 
country and across borders when trafficking is discovered, and corruption results in laws and 
judicial processes being disregarded. Corruption, especially governmental corruption weakens 
institutional safeguards that are rooted in basic human rights and other international norms which 
were originally made in order to protect the victims (Nick, 2011, p19).  
Moreover, corruption also helps traffickers and their accomplices to hide profits 
generated by human trafficking like laundered money that makes bribery possible Louise 
Shelley, in her book Human Trafficking: A global perspective, states in recent decades the 
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growth of public sector corruption has correlated closely with the rise in human trafficking. 
Numerous countries that are ranked poorly on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, such as also including Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria, the Philippines, and 
Pakistan, tend to become the largest source countries for human trafficking victims (Shelley, 
2010). Lyday (2000) found a strong positive correlation between a country’s Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Trafficking in Person’s Index (TIP).  
Corruption and human trafficking involve numerous institutions among source countries 
and destination countries, and might extend to ministries, legislatures and law enforcement 
bodies, and mutate into state capture. For instance, the Global Coalition against Corruption 
(2010) found evidence in Cameroon that local police commissioners allegedly blocked 
investigations of child trafficking and refused to exert the formal legal process of proper 
investigations. Even developed countries that are universally considered to have a control over 
corruption are involved in human trafficking. Philip Gounev (2010) points out that high-level 
staff members at the Belgian and French embassies in Bulgaria were found to be issuing 
numerous visas, often to prostitutes and organized crime networks, in return for payment (Philip, 
2010, p6). Moreover, highly democratic governments like the US may contract out services to 
third party vendors that are then implicated in the employment of trafficked victims. Corruption 
undermines justice, human rights and dignity, and highly encourages the transregional criminal 
activities of human trafficking. Therefore, a country with high corruption level would not be 
likely to prevent HT.  
Region Conflicts  
Region conflicts have produced devastating situations conducive to human smuggling 
and diverse forms of trafficking. Armed conflicts and wars create millions of refuges who are 
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uprooted from their traditional societies with no viable means of support. Many of them are 
forced into the abysmal conditions of refugee camps and are dependent on the handouts of 
foreign aid organizations or NGOs. Their willingness to leave the refugee camps and the lack of 
ways to leave provide opportunities for traffickers. Children are trafficked in many regions to 
provide soldiers for rebel armies. Under the extremely unstable political environments and 
chaotic domestic social status, the government would not be willing to put their efforts into 
issues like HT. Moreover, trafficking in men and women also provides financial support for 
regional conflicts in Africa, Europe, Latin America and Asia (Sonja Wolte, 2007).  
The local governments are not willing to fight against HT and the involvement of UN 
only makes the problem worse (Corinna, 2006). Peacekeeping missions has been increasingly 
deployed in the last two decades to police conflicts and therefore numerous youthful male 
soldiers are placed in dangerous conditions far from their homelands, without adequate 
oversight, creating a large demand market for trafficked women (Sarah, 2005). Because of the 
loose control of the young soldiers, the abuse of women in the bars and brothels around the 
missions has become routine in the UN peacekeeping missions. Although the UN develops new 
policies that intend to eliminate peacekeepers’ exploitation of trafficked women, the problem still 
persists since enforcement of these policies has been intermittent and there has been an absence 
of political will to address the problem (Mendelosn, 2007).  
Therefore, a country that has armed conflicts would lose its political willingness and 
capacity to combat HT. This paper will consider the regional conflict as an important explanatory 
variable. 
Data Summary 
     Table-5 summarizes the control variables that will be used in this model. 
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(a) GDP per capita comes from the World Bank data bank of GDP per capita4, calculated as 
taking a country’s gross domestic product divided by the country’s population.  
(b) GDP annual growth comes from World Bank data bank of GDP annual growth5, calculated 
as (GDPZ[\]	^_[ − GDPZ[\]	`[]^)/ GDPyear zero and represents as percentages.  
(c) The Gini index that comes from the World Bank data bank of inequality6, is scaled from 0 
(perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality); indicating with higher the Gini index, the 
country is more unequal. However, there is lots of missing data in World Bank database. 
Therefore, the data set is not well established.  
(d) Transparency International has released the Corruption Perceptions index annually since 
2001. I use their reports from 2002 to 2016 and generate a list of all the countries (total 176 
countries) in alphabetical order with their corruption perceptions index. The index ranges 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), indicating that with higher scores, the country is 
less corrupted.  
(e) Jose Antonio Cheibub’s dataset is a classification of political regimes as democracy or 
dictatorship. This paper uses democracy as a dummy variable where 0 means not democratic 
and 1 represents democracy. 
(f) The conflict data is from Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) armed conflict dataset 
version 4-2016. The main unit in this dataset is an “Armed Conflict” that is defined by 
UCDP7. They define four types of armed conflict: 1) extra systemic armed conflicts that 
																																																						
4	For the original database, see 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD&country= 
5	For the original database, see 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD&country= 
6	For the original database, see 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country= 
7 For a more specific and clear definition see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ 
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occur between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory, 2) interstate armed 
conflict that occurs between two or more states, 3) internal armed conflict that occurs 
between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without 
intervention from other states, and 4) internationalized internal opposition groups with 
intervention from other states. This paper will take the regional conflict as a dummy 
variable, and make countries with interstate and internal armed conflicts as 1, others as 0. 
 
Ologit regression with control variables 
Equations: 
(1) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI +𝛽i𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝛽k𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠8 + 𝜀HI 
(2) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI +𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝛽i𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝛽k𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙HI +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
(3) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI +𝛽i𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝛽k𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
Results  
In order to make the results more straightforward and readable, this paper uses esstab (ssc 
install estout) to generate summary statistics by groups, with columns for the coefficient and P-
																																																						
8		This model also includes the dummy regions variable since from Graph-1 & 2, there is a significant region 
differential occurs in the nation’s behavior of combating HT. 
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value where * represents that the result is statistically significant (95%), ** shows that the result 
is very statistically significant (99%), and *** represents that the result is statistically crucial 
(99.9%). With more * in the table, the explanatory variable can better explain the dependent 
variable. 
From Table-6, both net FDI and globalization index have a strong positive relationship 
with a nation’s ability of combating HT, which is statistically significant; however, trade 
openness does not have a statistical relationship with a country’s capacity for preventing HT. 
Even if the results show that trade openness is not statistically significant, it does not necessarily 
mean that trade openness is not a determining factor on combating HT. The reason why the result 
is not statistically significant could be that trade openness has a strong correlation with GDP per 
capita. It implies a further analysis on this issue. For the control variable, GDP per capita, GDP 
annual growth, and dummy democracy, they all have a significant positive relationship with 
nations’ behaviors of preventing HT in all cases. Region dummy of Asia has a negative 
relationship with a nation’s effort to combat HT and it is statistically significant. Inequality, 
corruption level, dummy conflict, region dummy of Africa, and region dummy of Europe do not 
have a statistically significant relationship with a state’s action of combating HT.  
In general, according to the results above, increasing global integration would enhance a 
country’s ability to combat HT. However, this model still needs to consider the problems of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
Examine the Test  
– Multicollinearity 
One of the classic assumptions to ensure that the OLS estimators are unbiased is that 
none of the independent variables are constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among 
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the independent variables, and this assumption persists in the Ologit regression model. 
Therefore, I run the VIF (variance inflation factors), which describes how much multicollinearity 
(correlation between predictors) exists in a regression analysis, and the results are shown in 
Table-7.   
From the table, the mean of vif is 1.72, which shows that the predictors in this model are 
moderately correlated. Although it shows that the predictors in this model are moderately 
correlated, the coefficients are still strong and statistically significant, and therefore, the 
multicollinearity problem should not be considered as a serious flaw.  
– Serial Correlation & Heteroscedasticity 
     The standard error component panel data model assumes that the disturbances have 
homoscedastic variance and constant serial correlation in the random individual effects (Hsiao, 
2003). However, these may be restrictive assumptions for a lot of panel data applications. For 
instance, the cross-sectional units may be varying in size and therefore, resulting 
heteroscedasticity. Moreover, in the context of time series, the error in a period might influence 
the error in a subsequent period – the next period or beyond. This phenomenon is called serial 
correlation, which is a common manner in which the assumption of independence of errors is 
violated9.  
One way to deal with both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity is to use robust 
estimation of the variance covariance matrix of the reported estimates. Therefore, this paper will 
use vce (robust) regression to eliminate the problem of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, 
showing in Table – 8 & Table – 9.  
 From above tables, the globalization index and net FDI are still statistically significant, as 
																																																						
9	One of the assumptions of both simple and multiple regression analysis is that the error terms are independent 
from one another – they are uncorrelated.  
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well as GDP per capita, GDP annual growth, dummy democracy, and region dummy of Asia.  
– Robustness Analysis 
 Robustness analysis or sensitivity analysis is an analysis aimed at checking if a certain 
method is robust. Statistics considers here a set of tools aimed at ascertaining the degree of 
dependence of a statistical model on single or groups of observations (Chatterjee, 1988). A lack 
of sensitivity to such aspects is known as robustness. This paper’s sensitivity analysis looks for 
influential observations mostly affecting some or all of the aspects of the model considered. In 
order to guarantee that the results do not depend on one particular model, this paper will 
therefore do a robust analysis. The sequence shows as following: 
(1) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝜀HI 
(2) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝜀HI 
(3) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + +𝛽e𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(4) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(5) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝜀HI 
(6) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝜀HI 
(7) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝛽e𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI +𝜀HI 
(8) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI +𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝛽i𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(9) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI ++𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
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(10) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI +𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
 From the Table – 10, the globalization index has a positive relationship with the country’s 
ability to combat human trafficking in all ten models and therefore, our model is robust and the 
results do not depend on one particular model. As the same logic, we will then do the test with 
net FDI as the independent variable.  
(11) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝜀HI 
(12) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝜀HI 
(13) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + +𝛽e𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(14) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(15) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝜀HI 
(16) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝜀HI 
(17) 𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI + 𝛽e𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(18) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI +𝛽i𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑦HI + 𝜀HI 
(19) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
(20) 	𝑦HI∗ = 	𝛼H + 𝛽6𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝐹𝐷𝐼HI + 𝛽a𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎HI + 𝛽e𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎHI +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀HI 
 Like the globalization index, the net FDI has a positive relationship with the country’s 
ability to combat human trafficking in all ten models and therefore, our model is robust and the 
results do not depend on one particular model.  
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Conclusion 
  
 The relationship between globalization and human trafficking is ambiguous and 
complicated. Lots of scholars have studied the nexus between these two phenomena. Some argue 
that transnational criminals have been major beneficiaries of globalization. Human trafficking 
has been among the fastest growing forms of transnational crime because current world 
conditions have created an unbalanced world economy and living standards. The supply exists 
because globalization has caused increasing economic and demographic disparities between the 
developing and developed world (Louise, 2012). Migration flows are enormous, and this illicit 
trade is hidden within the massive movement of people. Others argue that globalization helps to 
build international laws that criminalize human trafficking and also build global network 
between international governmental organizations and local governments to combat human 
trafficking. However, there is little academic study to show whether the increase in global 
integration can help to combat human trafficking or not. This paper provides empirical evidence 
to show that the increase in globalization will enhance a country’s ability to combat human 
trafficking.  
 This paper uses tier placement as the independent variable in the ordered logit regression 
model and has three measurements of globalization. From the results, both globalization index 
and the net FDI have a positive relationship with a nation’s ability to combat human trafficking, 
as well as GDP per capita, GDP annual growth, and Dummy democracy while region dummy of 
Asia has a negative impact on country’s capacity of combating HT. This paper further deals with 
the problems of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation and does a robustness 
analysis to guarantee the robustness of the model.  
However, as every other statistics model, this model has certain limitations as well. For 
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example, GDP per capita might be an endogenous variable since it is influenced by other 
variables in the model like Dummy conflicts.  Therefore, for further analysis, it is necessary to 
introduce an instrumental variable, for instance, energy consumption per capita, to identify the 
hidden (unobserved) correlations, and to show the correlation between the globalization and 
nations’ capacity of combating human trafficking.  
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Table – 1 
 
Table – 2 
 
Table – 3 
 
 
. 
globalizat~x        1,990    56.55067    17.40252      22.02      92.63
      netfdi        2,509    9.70e+09    3.58e+10  -2.97e+10   7.34e+11
tradeopenn~s        2,400    92.81243    54.71501    19.1008   455.4151
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
                                                                               
        /cut3     2.136949   .1019421                      1.937146    2.336751
        /cut2     .4935325    .080195                      .3363532    .6507118
        /cut1    -1.778511   .0898961                     -1.954704   -1.602318
                                                                               
tradeopenness    -.0033726    .000724    -4.66   0.000    -.0047917   -.0019535
                                                                               
      ranking        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood = -2526.6085                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0043
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(1)        =      21.67
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      2,111
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2526.6085  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2526.6085  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2526.6287  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2537.4445  
                                                                                    
             /cut3    -1.420973   .1804576                     -1.774664   -1.067283
             /cut2    -3.104463   .1790729                     -3.455439   -2.753486
             /cut1    -6.011591   .2294324                      -6.46127   -5.561912
                                                                                    
globalizationindex    -.0718122    .003256   -22.06   0.000    -.0781939   -.0654305
                                                                                    
           ranking        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
Log likelihood = -1809.8123                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1369
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(1)        =     573.94
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      1,718
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1809.8123  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1809.8123  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1809.8523  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1822.8059  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2096.7837  
	 54	
Table – 4 
 
 
Table – 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1 observation completely determined.  Standard errors questionable.
                                                                              
       /cut3     2.201717   .0760253                       2.05271    2.350724
       /cut2      .600056   .0476078                      .5067464    .6933656
       /cut1    -1.797312   .0634625                     -1.921696   -1.672928
                                                                              
      netfdi    -2.62e-11   2.57e-12   -10.21   0.000    -3.13e-11   -2.12e-11
                                                                              
     ranking        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -2561.2137                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0363
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                LR chi2(0)        =     192.79
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      2,192
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2561.2137  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2561.2137  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2561.2148  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2561.9412  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2657.6109  
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Table – 6 
 
. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                            
N                     357             361             337   
                                                            
                   (1.55)          (1.99)         (-0.96)   
_cons               1.874           2.126*         -1.332   
cut3                                                        
                                                            
                  (-0.27)         (-0.09)         (-2.38)   
_cons              -0.315         -0.0965          -3.276*  
cut2                                                        
                                                            
                  (-2.90)         (-3.08)         (-4.55)   
_cons              -3.498**        -3.295**        -6.606***
cut1                                                        
                                                            
                                                  (-3.11)   
globalizat~x                                      -0.0503** 
                                  (-2.39)                   
netfdi                          -9.79e-12*                  
                   (0.23)          (0.13)          (0.38)   
dummyvaria~e       0.0831          0.0475           0.171   
                   (1.76)          (1.43)          (0.73)   
dummyregio~a        0.917           0.731           0.406   
                   (3.03)          (3.08)          (1.97)   
dummyregio~n        1.010**         1.028**         0.716*  
                  (-0.46)         (-0.64)         (-0.40)   
dummyconfl~t       -0.197          -0.276          -0.173   
                  (-4.80)         (-5.02)         (-2.14)   
dummydemoc~y       -1.648***       -1.723***       -0.853*  
                  (-1.40)         (-1.38)         (-1.03)   
corruption~l      -0.0105         -0.0103        -0.00824   
                  (-0.22)          (0.12)         (-1.03)   
inequality       -0.00486         0.00252         -0.0234   
                  (-2.13)         (-1.97)         (-2.01)   
gdpannualg~h      -0.0658*        -0.0599*        -0.0660*  
                  (-6.82)         (-5.54)         (-4.24)   
gdppercapita   -0.0000634***   -0.0000531***   -0.0000447***
                  (-0.16)                                   
tradeopenn~s    -0.000499                                   
ranking                                                     
                                                            
                  ranking         ranking         ranking   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)   
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Table – 7 
 
Table – 8 
 
 
 
 
 
    Mean VIF        1.72
                                    
corruption~l        1.07    0.932712
gdpannualg~h        1.31    0.764942
tradeopenn~s        1.32    0.759894
dummyconfl~t        1.46    0.682652
dummyregio~a        1.51    0.662280
dummydemoc~y        1.63    0.611973
dummyregio~n        1.72    0.581171
gdppercapita        1.97    0.507073
dummyvaria~e        2.49    0.402081
  inequality        2.67    0.374416
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
                                                                                     
              /cut3    -1.331971   1.459488                     -4.192514    1.528572
              /cut2    -3.276294   1.521399                     -6.258182   -.2944058
              /cut1    -6.606326   1.572373                     -9.688119   -3.524532
                                                                                     
dummyvariableeurope     .1712926   .5030131     0.34   0.733    -.8145949     1.15718
  dummyregionafrica     .4064895   .5691353     0.71   0.475    -.7089952    1.521974
   dummyregionasian     .7162398    .416792     1.72   0.086    -.1006575    1.533137
      dummyconflict    -.1729397   .4234854    -0.41   0.683    -1.002956    .6570764
     dummydemocracy    -.8528763    .421345    -2.02   0.043    -1.678697   -.0270552
    corruptionlevel    -.0082408   .0080526    -1.02   0.306    -.0240236    .0075419
         inequality    -.0233977   .0231238    -1.01   0.312    -.0687196    .0219241
    gdpannualgrowth    -.0660292   .0375436    -1.76   0.079    -.1396132    .0075549
       gdppercapita    -.0000447   .0000139    -3.21   0.001    -.0000719   -.0000174
 globalizationindex    -.0502768   .0205809    -2.44   0.015    -.0906147    -.009939
                                                                                     
            ranking        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                    Robust
                                                                                     
Log pseudolikelihood = -264.31991               Pseudo R2         =     0.2817
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)     =     152.63
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =        337
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -264.31991  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -264.31991  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -264.32031  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -264.46393  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -271.49998  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -367.99942  
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Table – 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                     
              /cut3     2.126069   1.143058                     -.1142838    4.366422
              /cut2    -.0964636   1.127457                     -2.306238    2.113311
              /cut1    -3.294945   1.124107                     -5.498155   -1.091736
                                                                                     
dummyvariableeurope     .0475077   .3934805     0.12   0.904    -.7236998    .8187153
  dummyregionafrica     .7309282   .5200306     1.41   0.160    -.2883129    1.750169
   dummyregionasian     1.027634   .3532818     2.91   0.004     .3352141    1.720053
      dummyconflict    -.2756011   .4352189    -0.63   0.527    -1.128615    .5774123
     dummydemocracy    -1.722995    .338456    -5.09   0.000    -2.386357   -1.059633
    corruptionlevel    -.0102988   .0075263    -1.37   0.171      -.02505    .0044525
         inequality     .0025228   .0203861     0.12   0.902    -.0374333    .0424788
    gdpannualgrowth    -.0598926   .0342341    -1.75   0.080    -.1269901    .0072049
       gdppercapita    -.0000531   .0000128    -4.14   0.000    -.0000782    -.000028
             netfdi    -9.79e-12   4.89e-12    -2.00   0.046    -1.94e-11   -1.95e-13
                                                                                     
            ranking        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                    Robust
                                                                                     
Log pseudolikelihood = -287.41407               Pseudo R2         =     0.2929
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =          .
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =        361
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -287.41407  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -287.41407  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -287.41412  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =   -287.621  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -296.97164  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =   -406.459  
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Table – 10 
 
. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>          862             663            1681             656   
N                    1695            1693             663             663             663            1670    
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      (-0.62)         (-0.63)         (-7.42)         (-0.35)   
                  (-3.02)         (-5.34)          (1.57)         (-0.02)          (1.72)         (-1.99)    
>       -0.221          -0.395          -1.390***       -0.229   
_cons              -0.630**        -1.088***        1.037         -0.0103           1.188          -0.465*   
>                                                                
cut3                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      (-5.54)         (-3.89)        (-16.90)         (-3.43)   
                 (-11.38)        (-14.09)         (-1.41)         (-3.05)         (-1.11)         (-9.55)    
>       -1.959***       -2.368***       -3.135***       -2.185***
_cons              -2.345***       -2.827***       -0.900          -1.980**        -0.749          -2.218*** 
>                                                                
cut2                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>     (-12.64)         (-8.48)        (-25.81)         (-7.99)   
                 (-21.50)        (-23.41)         (-6.14)         (-7.50)         (-5.68)        (-19.62)    
>       -5.200***       -5.509***       -6.189***       -5.395***
_cons              -5.312***       -5.733***       -4.145***       -5.134***       -3.999***       -5.364*** 
>                                                                
cut1                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      (-2.82)                                                   
                                                                                                             
>       -0.637**                                                 
dummyconfl~t                                                                                                 
>       (4.96)                                                   
                                                                                                   (4.67)    
>        0.791***                                                
dummyregio~n                                                                                        0.553*** 
>      (-6.71)                        (-10.30)         (-1.93)   
                                                                                                  (-8.80)    
>       -1.171***                       -1.138***       -0.484   
dummydemoc~y                                                                                       -1.011*** 
>                       (2.50)                          (2.82)   
                                                   (0.93)          (2.57)          (0.98)                    
>                       0.0240*                         0.0285** 
inequality                                        0.00917          0.0247*        0.00965                    
>      (-2.41)                                                   
                                   (1.74)                          (1.69)          (0.73)         (-0.73)    
>      -0.0406*                                                  
gdpannualg~h                       0.0182                          0.0331          0.0145        -0.00790    
>      (-6.79)                                                   
                  (-6.17)                         (-6.80)                         (-6.68)         (-6.25)    
>   -0.0000478***                                                
gdppercapita   -0.0000241***                   -0.0000565***                   -0.0000557***   -0.0000267*** 
>      (-5.53)        (-12.67)        (-17.86)        (-10.02)   
                 (-13.38)        (-20.56)         (-4.37)        (-11.62)         (-4.22)         (-9.85)    
>      -0.0367***      -0.0795***      -0.0613***      -0.0741***
globalizat~x      -0.0544***      -0.0687***      -0.0367***      -0.0762***      -0.0358***      -0.0440*** 
>                                                                
ranking                                                                                                      
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking   
                  ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking    
>          (7)             (8)             (9)            (10)   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)    
 >                                                                
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Table – 11 
 
. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>          751             751             751            1053   
N                    2154            2153            2152             751            2107             729    
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>       (8.04)         (14.45)          (9.31)          (6.91)   
                  (23.90)         (27.80)         (21.93)         (13.92)         (17.15)         (11.02)    
>        3.408***        5.822***        4.513***        1.140***
_cons               1.997***        2.608***        2.130***        5.492***        1.450***        4.537*** 
>                                                                
cut3                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>       (3.77)         (10.85)          (5.63)         (-4.57)   
                   (4.71)         (13.69)          (5.27)         (10.21)         (-4.08)          (6.69)    
>        1.451***        3.869***        2.521***       -0.692***
_cons               0.251***        0.894***        0.379***        3.555***       -0.275***        2.474*** 
>                                                                
cut2                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      (-4.31)          (3.39)         (-1.68)        (-18.65)   
                 (-29.82)        (-21.18)        (-25.15)          (2.69)        (-30.43)         (-1.40)    
>       -1.662***        1.086***       -0.720          -3.888***
_cons              -2.534***       -1.549***       -2.411***        0.849**        -2.937***       -0.494    
>                                                                
cut1                                                                                                         
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>                                                      (-4.07)   
                                                                                                             
>                                                       -0.839***
dummyconfl~t                                                                                                 
>                                       (5.29)          (5.05)   
                                                                                                             
>                                        1.073***        0.717***
dummyregio~n                                                                                                 
>                                                     (-10.44)   
                                                                                 (-17.87)         (-9.57)    
>                                                       -1.608***
dummydemoc~y                                                                       -1.672***       -1.902*** 
>       (2.22)          (7.07)          (3.68)                   
                                                                   (7.39)                          (7.80)    
>       0.0200*         0.0583***       0.0354***                
inequality                                                         0.0609***                       0.0669*** 
>                       (4.91)          (1.02)         (-3.49)   
                                   (5.94)          (2.65)                                                    
>                       0.0869***       0.0193         -0.0530***
gdpannualg~h                       0.0554***       0.0258**                                                  
>     (-10.35)                         (-8.51)        (-14.19)   
                 (-16.89)                        (-16.15)                                                    
>   -0.0000734***                   -0.0000617***   -0.0000790***
gdppercapita   -0.0000575***                   -0.0000555***                                                 
>      (-2.31)         (-6.34)         (-2.78)         (-2.24)   
                  (-4.09)         (-9.84)         (-4.22)         (-6.83)         (-8.53)         (-6.07)    
>    -9.43e-12*      -2.95e-11***    -1.18e-11**     -4.46e-12*  
netfdi          -8.42e-12***    -2.47e-11***    -8.69e-12***    -3.20e-11***    -2.23e-11***    -2.73e-11*** 
>                                                                
ranking                                                                                                      
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
>      ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking   
                  ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking         ranking    
>          (7)             (8)             (9)            (10)   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)    
 >                                                                
                                                                                                             
	 60	
Reference 
 
Annex 1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. (n.d.). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective, 
179-190. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.45 
 
Bales, K. (2005). Understanding the Demand behind Human Trafficking. Understanding Global 
Slavery, 154-171. doi:10.1525/california/9780520245068.003.0008 
 
Bales, K. (2005). Understanding Global Slavery. 
doi:10.1525/california/9780520245068.001.0001 
 
Bales, K. (2012). Disposable people: new slavery in the global economy. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
 
Biemann, U. (2002). Remotely sensed: a topography of the global sex trade. Feminist Review, 
70(1), 75-88. doi:10.1057/palgrave/fr/9400005 
 
Carrington, K. (2006). Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and ChildrenSex 
Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children, by FarrKathryn. New York, NY: 
Worth Publishers, 2005. 224 pp. $18.20 paper. ISBN: 0716755483. Contemporary 
Sociology, 35(2), 175-177. doi:10.1177/009430610603500248 
 
Chapter 2. Market Demand. (n.d.). Market Demand. doi:10.1515/9781400863716.30 
 
Cho, S., Dreher, A., & Neumayer, E. (n.d.). Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human 
Trafficking? SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1986065 
 
Confronting Globalization in Anti-trafficking Strategies in Asia. (n.d.). Retrieved May 01, 2017, 
from https://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-affairs/101/confronting-
globalization-anti-trafficking-strategies-asia 
 
Deighan, C. (2010). A Business of Supply and Demand: The Trafficking of Women and Girls 
from Russia and Ukraine. Human Trafficking in Europe, 82-96. 
doi:10.1057/9780230281721_6 
 
 
 
 
 
	 61	
Dougherty, C. (2016). Introduction to econometrics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Globalization and Child Labor:Review of the Issues - DeepDyve. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2017, 
from 
https://www.bing.com/cr?IG=5C573AEAF63E43A79429374683032A71&CID=08F4945
CBC216A02012A9E29BDB16B2F&rd=1&h=aLBiI9JLN91GlrzbdpgIfAJZS_pUIp7cNW
24B_tjzME&v=1&r=https%3a%2f%2fwww.deepdyve.com%2flp%2fsage%2fglobalizatio
n-and-child-labor-review-of-the-issues-knusCNUigT&p=DevEx,5064.1 
 
Hodge, D. R., & Lietz, C. A. (2007). The International Sexual Trafficking of Women and 
Children. Affilia, 22(2), 163-174. doi:10.1177/0886109907299055 
 
Holmes, L. (n.d.). People Smuggling and Human Trafficking Within, from and through Central 
and Eastern Europe. Trafficking and Human Rights. doi:10.4337/9781849806800.00011 
 
Hopper, M. S. (2015). Slavery, Dates, and Globalization. Slaves of One Master, 51-79. 
doi:10.12987/yale/9780300192018.003.0002 
 
Human Trafficking: The Shameful Face of Migration. (2011). PLoS Medicine, 8(6). 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001047 
 
ILO ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 
2017, from 
http://www.bing.com/cr?IG=766BB8316D5E4504870D8B0245EC7E48&CID=0336B592
43346BC325EBBFE742A46AFA&rd=1&h=4sGjL9OI0jOTMZQpBR9S5Asog6xJ5D3A
mK7WaRVsg-
U&v=1&r=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ilo.org%2fwcmsp5%2fgroups%2fpublic%2f%40ed_nor
m%2f%40declaration%2fdocuments%2fpublication%2fwcms_090356.pdf&p=DevEx,506
1.1 
 
Impe, K. V. (2000). People for Sale: The Need for a Multidisciplinary Approach towards Human 
Trafficking. International Migration, 38(3), 113-191. doi:10.1111/1468-2435.00117 
 
Jac-Kucharski, A. (2012). The Determinants of Human Trafficking: A US Case Study. 
International Migration, 50(6), 150-165. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00777.x 
 
Jac-Kucharski, A. (2012). The Determinants of Human Trafficking: A US Case Study. 
International Migration, 50(6), 150-165. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00777.x 
 
 
	 62	
Karabat, A. (2015, May 12). Ethiopia: "We're Fighting the Ugly Face of Globalization". 
Retrieved May 01, 2017, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201505121740.html 
 
Laczko, F. (n.d.). Enhancing Data Collection and Research on Trafficking in Persons. Measuring 
Human Trafficking, 37-44. doi:10.1007/0-387-68044-6_5 
 
Lessard, M. R. (2015). Human trafficking in colonial Vietnam. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
 
Logistic (and logit) regression. (n.d.). The SAGE Dictionary of Statistics. 
doi:10.4135/9780857020123.n307 
Logistic Regression. (n.d.). Logit Modeling, 43-60. doi:10.4135/9781412984836.n4 
 
Mameli, P. A. (2002). Crime, Law and Social Change, 38(1), 67-80. 
doi:10.1023/a:1019876429551 
 
National Case Studies on Trafficking of Human Beings in Thailand, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom. (n.d.). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective, 39-84. 
doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.17 
 
Nautz, J., & Marquez, E. (n.d.). The Transnational Illegal Market of Trafficking in Human 
Beings – Actors and Discourses: A Transatlantic Comparison. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1832552 
 
Obokata, T. (2006). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective. 
doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247 
 
Ordered Models. (n.d.). Logit and Probit, 5-44. doi:10.4135/9781412984829.n2 
 
Potrafke, N. (2016). Erratum to: Policies against human trafficking: the role of religion and 
political institutions. Economics of Governance, 17(4), 387-396. doi:10.1007/s10101-016-
0185-1 
 
Ryan, C. (1997). Limits to globalization—a review of ‘Globalization and Tourism’—the 46th 
congress of the international association of scientific experts in Tourism (AIEST), 
Rotorua, New Zealand—September, 1996. Tourism Management, 18(3), 184-186. 
doi:10.1016/s0261-5177(97)88229-5 
 
	 63	
Scarpa, S. (2008). The International Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade and the Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings. Trafficking in Human Beings, 41-82. 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541904.003.0003 
 
Shelley, L. I. (2010). Human trafficking: a global perspective. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Shifman, P. (n.d.). 14. Trafficking and women’s human rights in a globalised world. Women 
Reinventing Globalisation, 125-132. doi:10.3362/9780855988814.014 
 
Smuggling and Trafficking: A Conference Report. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2017, from 
https://www.bing.com/cr?IG=3ED7E1ACD8BA4F99ABC1D1D36684F25F&CID=3EBA
D24F085A6BAA05CED83A09CA6AFA&rd=1&h=COlPPd9Vibf63sG9QZVFsLIUopVv
Ff3Y3fc_8pnDCw4&v=1&r=https%3a%2f%2fwww.researchgate.net%2fpublication%2f2
74840147_Smuggling_and_Trafficking_A_Conference_Report&p=DevEx,5061.1 
 
The Role of Inter-Governmental Organisations in Relation to Trafficking of Human Beings. 
(n.d.). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective, 85-120. 
doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.25 
 
Trafficking in Human Beings : Vulnerability, Criminal Law and Human Rights. (n.d.). Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law : Between Resistance and Compliance? 
doi:10.5040/9781474201896.ch-010 
 
Trafficking in persons report. (2002-2016). Trends in Organized Crime, 10(1), 5-15. 
doi:10.1007/s12117-006-1022-7 
 
Trafficking of Human Beings as a Human Rights Abuse: Obligations and Accountability of Non-
State Actors. (n.d.). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective, 121-
146. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.30 
 
U.S. Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons. (n.d.). PsycEXTRA Dataset. 
doi:10.1037/e560012006-001 
 
Understanding Trafficking. (n.d.). Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights 
Perspective, 9-38. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004154056.i-247.11 
 
 
 
 
	 64	
R. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved May 01, 2017, from 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-
persons.html 
 
What is the difference between robust analysis and ... (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2017, from 
https://www.bing.com/cr?IG=B0160007A0F543B19D72C636C74F8486&CID=3757448E
2ADE66D533854EFB2B4E675F&rd=1&h=6QxSAK3iJ0azG_P3ZB9QArcC2orUKg88r
Del28hAWaE&v=1&r=https%3a%2f%2fwww.researchgate.net%2fpost%2fwhat_is_the_d
ifference_between_robust_analysis_and_sensitivity_analysis&p=DevEx,5189.1 
 
Wheaton, E. M., Schauer, E. J., & Galli, T. V. (2010). Economics of Human Trafficking. 
International Migration, 48(4), 114-141. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00592.x 
 
Zhou, M. H. (2015). Five. Global Sex Trafficking Overview: Facts, Myths, and Debates. Sex 
Crimes. doi:10.7312/acke16948-005 
 
